

CSPD Civilian Operations in Europe: A Future For EU Security Policy

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Cooperation by EU states to conduct operations abroad is limited greatly by the mandate overlap of the UN, NATO, and CSDP. Of the latter two organizations, NATO is older, has more weaponry, and has the assistance of the United States. CSDP is often reliant on NATO for equipment and personnel, which gives NATO the ability to indirectly affect CSDP policy. So in matters of European security, NATO is the primary institution. This is unlikely to change, since the US keeps NATO strong and well-equipped, and since NATO operations do not put the credibility of EU member states on the line the way that CSDP operations do. Since inclusion in CSDP missions is voluntary and member states are unlikely to send troops into high-risk conflicts, CSDP operations have remained more limited in scope than their more brazen NATO counterparts.¹

Operations in countries outside of Europe's immediate vicinity brings CSDP outside of the purview of NATO. Aid to non-European countries is not outside of the wider EU mandate, since assistance to former colonies of European countries has been part of European policy since the EEC. But when it comes to military aid abroad, the CSDP enters into a similar relationship with the UN as it encountered with NATO in Europe. UN peacekeeping missions have a longer legacy in the international community, and since the operational structure of the UN and CSDP are so similar, European efforts often appear redundant. Most CSDP missions occur in tandem with, directly before/after, or with the approval of the UN or NATO. The EU tends to only take initiative when the risks are low, limiting the potential for disaster but also limiting the ability of CSDP to respond to urgent crises, or when regional European interests are at stake, particularly in Eastern Europe.²

¹ Koutrakos, *The EU Common Security and Defence Policy*, 2013: pages 104-107

² Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 2007: pages 165-167

Of the completed and ongoing CSDP missions, the ones that fill the most unique niche are “civilian/police” and “civilian/rule of law”. These tend to have lower troop commitments, more specific objectives, and usually a more limited timeframe. Right now, all such missions within European countries have been completed with the exception of the ones in Bosnia and Kosovo, and all completed missions in Europe were finished within three years.³ The primary military role of NATO is in larger security and stability operations, while the primary military role of the UN is in peacekeeping operations in places of global crisis. It could be that in more civilian-related missions involving police training and border security, CSDP may have found suitable policy priorities.⁴

Such activity is crisis prevention rather than crisis responsive, as it mostly has to do with strengthening local ability to cope with potential tumult. The EU is in a unique position to supervise crisis prevention in this way, since expert analysis of policy is so central to EU decision making. Preventative missions are also less costly in manpower and potential for casualties, making them more attractive to member states being asked to contribute forces. They also are in keeping with the European Union’s policies of expansion and integration, since civilian operations in developing Eastern European states stabilizes them and brings their policies closer to those of the stable, developed, Western European states supervising these endeavors. Such missions may eventually be instrumental in bringing more former Yugoslav and USSR satellites into the EU.

An early but important example of CSDP in non-EU Europe is in Bosnia. An EU-sponsored military mission called EUFOR Althea has been active since 2004 to oversee the

³ Pohl, *The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations*, 2003: page 311

⁴ Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 2007: page 168

implementation of the Bosnian peace process described in the Dayton agreement.⁵ This military endeavor was adopted from NATO with very little operational deviation: most of the objectives and personnel carried over from NATO's SFOR into the EU's EUFOR. SFOR (Stabilization Force) was itself a scale back from a larger earlier NATO operation called IFOR (Implementation Force), and EUFOR was scaled back even further. By the time EU forces took over, the immediate security threats in the region had been resolved by NATO's missions, and the remaining task of hunting down war criminals from the Bosnian war remained a NATO responsibility. Since 2004, the EU-led force has decreased in numbers as the situation in Bosnia continues to normalize, and the small force that remains there today is more a display of EU activism in the region than a real address to military needs.⁶

In parallel to the EUFOR mission was the EUPM (European Union police mission). This also took over from a UN-led police task force, but unlike the military concerns addressed by NATO, law enforcement concerns have had a more subtle destabilizing effect over Bosnia that only active long term engagement has been able to address. Organized crime in the region is involved with the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans and is a hugely destabilizing force there. EUPM began in 2003, before EUFOR, and while the EUFOR seems likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future, EUPM was in three distinct phases with specific goals and timeframes that have all been concluded. In these phases from 2003-2006 from 2006-2009, and from 2009-2012, EU forces have overseen police reform, have helped to combat organized crime, and have attempted to establish a sustainable domestic police force to safeguard peace in Bosnia. The difficulties that EU forces encountered there were mostly procedural: should police

⁵ European External Action Service, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/althea-bih/index_en.htm

⁶ Koutrakos, *The EU Common Security and Defence Policy*, 2013: pages 111-113

reform come from changed national law and order policies, a top-down solution, or should the EU try to reform law enforcement at the community level first, a bottom-up solution? By the time leaders of the EUPM had arrived at the conclusion that both were equally important, the mission had become entangled in political deadlock as newly formed Bosnian institutions squabbled over the details of EU involvement and its policy outcomes. By the time the EUPM was concluded, its accomplishments were incomplete and opinion of CSDP civilian missions was up in the air.⁷

Similar to Bosnia but on a smaller scale were the CSDP missions in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The government of FYROM had requested military assistance to maintain stability after ethnic unrest spilled over their Northern borders, unrest that was considered to be a relatively easy to rectify by the EU. A small European force called EUFOR Concordia with a short mandate of nine months was deployed in 2003.⁸ It was the first true military endeavor of CSDP, and even though it was taking over from an almost identical NATO operation, the mission was highly politicized and had representatives from every EU member state. The tiny Macedonian army and even tinier Albanian rebel force in the North were quickly reconciled, allowing the Concordia force to be pulled out to be replaced by a police mission known as Proxima.⁹ Proxima lasted from 2003 to 2005, and a follow-up police advisory mission known as EUPAT took over in FYROM for another year after that.¹⁰ The mandate of these two missions were similar to those of EUPM in Bosnia, and the problems that it

⁷ Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 2007: pages 168-171

⁸ European External Action Service,

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/concordia/mission-description/index_en.htm

⁹ Koutrakos, *The EU Common Security and Defence Policy*, 2013: pages 107-109

¹⁰ European External Action Service,

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/proxima-fyrom/index_en.htm

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupat/mission-description/index_en.htm

encountered were similar as well. Many different objectives by many different international organizations and many different domestic institutions bogged down implementation and often made policy incoherent. Although much needed work was done in curtailing organized crime in Macedonia, the lack of progress on creating a coherent national policy led to the mission being terminated.¹¹

The CSDP police mission with perhaps the highest stakes began in 2007, this one in Kosovo under the auspices of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It is unique among these CSDP operations in Europe in that it has never had an EU military aspect to it.¹² Although UN peacekeepers have been in the region since 1999 and NATO activity in Bosnia and Serbia had contributed to the demands for Kosovo independence, local opinion of the UN and NATO forces was poor and peace there was never enforced by a long term military commitment. Especially after the arrival of the European taskforce, called EULEX, the role of the UNMIK diminished and the EU took over the coordination of Kosovo. The number of EU personnel involved in EULEX was much higher than any previous law enforcement operation in Europe or outside of it: 1650 at its peak.¹³ The mandate of EULEX is also uniquely large and ambitious, since Kosovo is a crisis that was unfolding as the EU forces arrived, as opposed to Bosnia and FYROM where the immediate crises had already been at least partially addressed by other, usually military, bodies before the arrival of the EU. Since 2007, EULEX has attempted to create and implement a stable law enforcement system essentially from scratch, and while the government of Kosovo has repeatedly voted to extend the EULEX mandate, many residents of

¹¹ Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 2007: pages 171-172

¹² European External Action Service,

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eulex-kosovo/index_en.htm

¹³ Pohl, *The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations*, 2003: page 311

Kosovo have protested having an EU force taking charge of Kosovar law and order and the Kosovo-Serbian dialogue. With a mission so large and ambiguous and regional uncertainty over or resistance to Kosovo independence, progress has been slow and the future for EULEX is uncertain.¹⁴

These civilian missions by CSDP have great potential for the EU, and if their implementation difficulties can be resolved they may greatly aid the stabilization of Eastern European countries and accelerate their path into the EU. Western standards of law enforcement are not going to be easy to impose over societies used to living with organized crime and illicit trafficking, but such a transition needs to be made and the EU is the only organization that can appropriately wield the carrot of stabilizing forces and the stick of exclusion from the Union. And although the rocky start of CSPD operations in the region have perhaps made these carrots seem less sweet and these sticks less imposing, the EU is capable of learning from its experiences and becoming an international security provider as important in its areas of expertise as the UN or NATO are in theirs.

¹⁴ Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 2007: pages 178-179

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